[article]Signal failure causes train to smash through crossing gate

[Mark Gleeson]

Ok its not the 4 barrier automatic level crossing on the N7

Question is why the gates where not open in the first place. It is the responsibility of the gate keeper to verify the signals are working. Its fairly trivial to verify since the levers feel very light if the signal is jammed

Signal failure causes train to smash through crossing gate
Friday September 28 2007


A TRAIN crashed into a level crossing early yesterday after the signal lights became stuck and wrongly indicated the crossing was open to the train driver, it is believed.

Iarnrod Eireann are investigating the incident but they believe the lights became stuck the night before and were therefore incorrectly positioned.

The gates at the crossing at Sallymount, Lisnagry, Co Limerick, were closed when the 6.43am Limerick to Ballybrophy passenger train ploughed through the crossing.

There were no passengers on board and the driver and the guard were unharmed.

An investigation has been initiated by Iarnrod Eireann into the accident.

[Thomas J Stamp]

the 6.43am Limerick to Ballybrophy passenger train ploughed through the crossing.

There were no passengers on board and the driver and the guard were unharmed.

hard to imagaine this train "ploughing" though anything, note the very high passenger demand for this service. Should it start in Ballybrophy and go to Limerick there would be plenty of passengers, it suiute IE and the Unions to have this crazy timetable, it is a disgrace and a farce.

There was a guard?

[Mark Gleeson]

I'd take the signal failure line with a pinch of salt until the RSC get stuck in we will know in about 10 days if the investigation branch of the RSC are going to launch a full investigation. There was an incident in Kiltoom in 2001 and that was never really explained. Signal failure was put forward as reason turned out the rule book had been broken by the signalman not telling the gate keeper of the train still the signals where disputed

Signals don't typically fail wrong side, wrong being the train allowed to be past a signal it shouldn't most are right side such that the train is kept on the safe side. If the wire snaps the signal goes to danger. The gatekeeper should visually verify the signals return to danger after a train

All passenger trains on lines with manual signaling require a guard unless full radio coverage is available. Mobile phone coverage is suspect on most secondary lines

[zag]

This explanation sounds odd. I thought that since the days of the Armagh disaster (almost 120 years ago) railway engineers and operators had latched onto the concept of a fail-safe in safety systems.

It is unbelievable that we could be operating signalling systems in this day and age that result in a failure allowing traffic to proceed.

For those that don't know the story of the Armagh disaster - http://www.rmtbristol.org.uk/2006/06..._rail_dis.html and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armagh_rail_disaster

z

[Mark Gleeson]

Well it should go like this

The gate keeper has a 4 or 5 lever frame.

Gate closed, pulls the gate lock lever if provided, then the stop signal in the direction of travel of the train then the distant. The distant cant be pulled if the stop is at stop, its fairly idiot proof

If there is no gate lock it is possible to clear the signals without the gates being closed, if there is a gate lock the gates can't be opened if any of signals are showing proceed, if the gates are open the signals can't be cleared